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Abstract:  
This paper investigates the influence of oil price changes on corporate investment in 
the US using a large sample of 15,411 companies from 1984 to 2017. It adds to the 
literature by showing an asymmetric response of capital investments to oil price 
changes for non-oil companies. Particularly, positive oil price changes have a larger 
adverse impact on investments than the positive impact created by negative oil price 
changes. These results are important in assessing the impact of energy price 
fluctuations on the long-term investment decisions of US companies. 
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1. Introduction  
Oil-related products (e.g. gasoline) represent an important input that firms use for their 
operation. In fact, the profitability of oil-producing companies is more influenced by oil 
price changes than to oil-consuming company, since the latter is impacted by a range 
of other factors including oil price changes (Phan et al., 2015). Therefore, changes in oil 
prices may disrupt the critical decisions made by the company including the investment 
decisions because most investment expenditures are at least partly irreversible, that is, 
there is a cost of reducing capital if there is an unfavorable change in oil price. As a result, 
oil price changes carry serious implications on capital profitability and thus on investment 
decisions. 1  In addition, capital investment determines the growth prospects of the 
aggregate economy through capital accumulation. In the US market, which constitutes 
the sample of our study, the gross private domestic investment, including investment in 
plants, machinery, and equipment, accounted for around 18.1% of GDP in 2018 
(Economic Report of the President, 2019, Table B-4). 
 
 
1 Changes in oil price can affect the demand for company output. For example, the household 
disposable income decreases with higher cost for energy consumption. This in turn may reduce the 
sales and thus the profitability of the company. Edelstein and Kilian, 2007; Hamilton, 2009 and Kilian, 
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Oil price fluctuations may not only affect investments directly through their effect on 
company profitability but also may introduce uncertainty regarding future oil prices, 
causing firms to postpone growth plans and expansion decisions (Bernanke, 1983; 
Pindyck, 1991; Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1983). Other studies conclude that the influence 
on investment is negative and investment is less responsive to sales growth when oil price 
uncertainty is high (Elder and Serletis, 2010; Henriques and Sadorsky, 2011; Mohn and 
Misund, 2009; Ratti et al., 2011; Sadath and Acharya, 2015; Sadorsky, 2011; Uri, 1980; Wang 
et al., 2017; Yoon and Ratti, 2011).  
Kellogg (2014) finds that drilling activity slows down during periods of high oil price 
volatility. Empirical proof of the positive influence of uncertainty is also provided by 
Henriques and Sadorsky (2011), who find a U-shaped relationship between oil company 
investments and oil price uncertainty. Recently, Phan et al. (2019) and Maghyereh and 
Abdoh (2020) show that crude oil price uncertainty negatively influences corporate 
investment. Sadath and Acharya (2015) document a negative relationship between 
energy prices and corporate investment in the Indian manufacturing sector, while Wang 
et al. (2017) find that oil price uncertainty has a negative impact on corporate investment 
expenditure in China, especially for non-state-owned listed companies. Loria (2017) finds 
that, while a small oil price increase leads to a decline in U.S. nonresidential fixed 
investment, the effect of a large oil price increase is ambiguous. However, Çakır Melek 
et al. (2017), Çakır Melek (2018), and Bjørnland and Zhulanova (2019) show that the 
response of U.S. investment to oil price shocks has changed following the shale boom in 
mid-2016. Specifically, they find that U.S. investment has become more responsive to 
demand shocks and less responsive to oil supply shocks. They argue that higher oil prices 
make oil businesses more profitable, which allows them to increase both production and 
investment. Similarly, Gilje et al. (2016), Feyrer et al. (2017), and Allcott and Keniston (2018) 
examine the local implications of the shale boom and find strong positive spillovers for 
employment and wages. 
In all these studies, the influence of oil on investment is assumed to be symmetric and 
corporate capital expenditure sensitivity does not differentiate between the impact of 
positive and negative oil price changes. However, this distinction is important, as the 
differentiation allows for more accurate predictions and modeling of the reaction of 
corporate investment to oil price changes and uncertainty. In the literature, the analysis 
of asymmetry focuses on aggregate macroeconomic and stock markets, with no 
evidence on whether company investments respond differently to oil price increases and 
decreases. For example, Mork (1989) identifies asymmetry in the response of output to oil 
price shocks. An increase in oil price influences economic growth by a higher degree 
than a decrease in the oil price. Similar findings have been reported by Cologni and 
Manera (2009), Hamilton (2003), Lardic and Mignon (2008), Zhang (2008), and Awartani 
et al. (2020). The reaction of stock returns to oil prices is also found to be symmetric by 
Maghyereh and Al-Kandari (2006), Bachmeier (2008), Nandha and Faff (2008), and 
Maghyereh and Awartani (2016). Therefore, the main contribution of this paper lies in 
identifying the potential asymmetry in the response of the investments of US corporations 
to oil price changes. To the best of our knowledge, this analysis has not been yet 
conducted in the related empirical literature. 
The nature of the influence of oil price changes on investment differs across firms in 
different industries. Oil-producing firms are expected to benefit from oil price hikes and 
therefore invest more following the increase in oil prices. The investment decisions of oil 
companies under oil price uncertainty has been modeled and studied by many 
researchers. Hurn and Wright (1994); Favero et al. (1994) note that expected oil prices 
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development decision of oil corporations.2 Berntsen et al. (2018) indicate that the price 
of oil can only influence the investment and development of oil wells in Norway. Baqaee 
and Farhi (2017) and Çakır Melek (2018) find that negative oil shocks can have larger 
effects on the fixed investments of oil and gas companies than those of non-oil and gas 
companies. As the influence of oil price changes is different for oil companies, we use a 
sample of only oil and gas companies and another sample for all other companies.  
Our empirical results show significant asymmetry in the investment reaction of non-oil and 
gas companies to oil price changes. Particularly, the decrease in investments following 
oil price increase is higher than the increase in investments following oil price decrease. 
This indicates that positive changes in oil prices have a more determinantal impact on 
investments. This asymmetric investment response to oil price changes provides a further 
explanation for the asymmetry in the response of output to oil price shocks documented 
by Mork (1989) and others.3 On the other hand, oil and gas companies’ investments 
respond symmetrically to oil price changes where capital spending has the same 
sensitivity to positive and negative oil price shocks. Perhaps, the long-term nature, 
persistency, and irreversibility of these companies’ investments make them less sensitive 
to the annual changes in oil prices. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the dataset and 
the model. The analysis of the empirical results is presented in Section 3. Finally, Section 4 
draws concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
The sample includes all companies listed on three US exchanges: the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ. The annual financial data of all companies are collected o from 1984 to 2017 
from the Compustat database. From the original dataset, we excluded finance, 
insurance, real estate, not-for-profit organizations, and governmental companies due to 
the specific nature of their activity.4 All firms with missing data, with less than five years of 
data, or that belong to an industry not classified are also excluded from the sample. To 
alleviate the impact of outliers, we winsorized all firm-level variables at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles. The final sample consists of 15,411 firms, which sum up to 135,353 firm-year 
observations.  
The daily West Texas Intermediate (WTI) closing crude oil price is used and retrieved from 
the US Energy Information Agency. Finally, annual real GDP growth data of the US is 
obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
2 Investment in oil companies includes three stages: exploration, development, and extraction. 
There is always the option not to develop and postpone investment. Note that development 
investments are irreversible and are carried over a period that may extend to 10 years. 
3 In the literature, the asymmetry in the response of output is explained by reallocation, uncertainty 
and unemployment uncertainty, and monetary policy effects. See Hamilton (1988), Bernanke 
(1983), and Bernanke et al. (1997) for more in-depth analyses. 
4 The SIC codes for finance and real estate companies are 6000 and 6999 and those for not-for-
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Corporate investments are computed as the proportion of capital expenditure to total 
assets in the previous year and denoted as 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡. The percentage change in real oil price 
is computed and used as the main independent variable. Following the literature on the 
determinants of corporate investment, we control for leverage, cash flow, Tobin’s Q, 
profitability, and size. 5  US economic growth is the main determinant of corporate 
investment and is controlled for by including real GDP growth. To accommodate for any 
possible structural changes in the variables during the US financial crisis, a dummy that 
equals 1 in 2007, 2008, and 2009 is added to the model. Table 1 lists the variables and 
their definitions and sources.  
Table 1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 Corporate investment; calculated as capital 
expenditure scaled by total assets in the previous 
year 
Compustat 




+  Positive real crude oil price change Authors' 
calculations 
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1
−  Negative real crude oil price change Authors' 
calculations 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 Firm leverage ratio; calculated as total debt 
(including loans, securities and other current 
liabilities) scaled by total assets 
Compustat 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 Cash flow; calculated as earnings before interest 
and taxes minus taxes and interest expense plus 
depreciation and amortization, scaled by total 
assets 
Compustat 
𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 Tobin's Q; calculated as the ratio of market value 
of equity plus preferred stock plus total debt to total 
assets 
Compustat 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 Profitability; calculated as the ratio of earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortizations (EBITDA) to total assets 
Compustat 
𝑆𝑆ize𝑡𝑡 Firm size; calculated as the natural logarithm of 
total assets 
Compustat 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 Real GDP growth Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 Crisis dummy; equals 1 if the year is in the global 
financial crisis (2007–2009), and 0 otherwise 
 
Note: This table describes the variables used in the paper. 
Empirical literature typically studies corporate investment behavior using a dynamic 
panel model (see, e.g., Blundell et al., 1999; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Gulen and Ion, 2015). 
Therefore, we estimate the following baseline dynamic panel model: 
 
5  See, for instance, Henriques and Sadorsky (2011), Andreou et al. (2017), Phan et al. (2019), 
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𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜∆𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1 + �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘=1
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖+𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ,     (1) 
where 𝑇𝑇 and 𝑡𝑡 stand for the firm and the year, respectively. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is the dependent 
variable, representing investment expenditures as a percentage of the total assets of firm 
𝑇𝑇 at time 𝑡𝑡 . The lagged value of corporate investment is added as an explanatory 
variable to control for persistence and possible autocorrelation in company investment 
spending.  
The main independent variable is denoted as ∆𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1 , representing the percentage 
change in real oil price. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖.𝑡𝑡𝑘𝑘  is the vector of firm-level control variables—leverage, cash 
flows, profitability, Tobin’s Q, and firm size. 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 is the US real GDP growth rate, which 
is used to control the general economic conditions that influence capital spending in all 
firms. All control variables are lagged by one year to avoid potential endogeneity and 
simultaneity bias in the estimates. 𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 is a crisis dummy variable that takes 1 in crisis 
years, and 0 otherwise. The firm-specific effects that control for firm heterogeneity are 
captured by 𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖, which is a firm variant but time-invariant. Time heterogeneity is captured 
by 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡, which does not change across companies and only changes from year to year. 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 
is the error term, assumed to be normally distributed, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡~𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 𝐼𝐼(0,𝜎𝜎2).  
As Equation (1) is linear in real oil returns, it is unable to capture any potential asymmetry 
in the response of corporate investment to oil price changes. Hence, we adjust it by 
decomposing the oil price changes into positive (?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡+) and negative components:6  
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡
+ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡+, 0} ⇒ ?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡+ = �?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡         𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 ∆𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 > 00        𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 , 
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡
− = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇{?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−, 0} ⇒ 𝑜𝑜̇ 𝑡𝑡− = �?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡         𝑇𝑇𝑃𝑃 ∆𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡 ≤ 00        𝑜𝑜𝑡𝑡ℎ𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿 .e 
 
The extended version of Equation (1) to include asymmetries can be written as: 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1+ + 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1− + �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘=1
𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽𝑔𝑔𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1+ 𝛽𝛽𝑐𝑐𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡+𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖+𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 .                                                                                                            (2) 
 
In this specification, asymmetry in the influence of oil price changes is captured by 
parameters 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜+  and 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜− . If 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜+  and 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜−  are statistically equivalent, the conjecture of 
asymmetry is not statistically supported. Hence, we test the hypothesis of symmetry for 
the response of investment to oil price movements by using a Wald test of the null 
hypothesis (𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜+ = 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜− ) against the alternative (𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜+ ≠ 𝛽𝛽𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜− ). 
 To estimate models (1) and (2), we use a system GMM estimator as in Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator has two steps and yields 
asymptotically efficient and consistent parameters. It also controls for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity and potential endogeneity problems. The GMM estimates are 
 
6 Mork (1989) has implemented a similar adjustment to study asymmetry in the response of output 
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generated using two to four lags of the explanatory variables as instruments and then 
the standard errors of these estimates are corrected using the procedure advocated by 
Windmeijer (2005). 
 
3. Empirical results 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of corporate investment, oil price changes, and the 
rest of control variables in the model. The median company invests annually an average 
of 3.8% of its total assets over the sample period. The minimum capital spending is zero, 
which indicates some companies do not even compensate for depreciated capital over 
the year. The average highest capital spending is around 78% of total assets. The oil prices 
increase just under 1% annually over the sample period, with the biggest drawdown in 
1986, when the oil prices dropped by more than 28%. The biggest increase in oil prices 
took place in 2000 (19.5%). Figure 1 displays the time series of annual oil price returns and 
corporate investments as a proportion of total assets over the sample period. Most of the 
time, company investments and oil returns move in the same direction, particularly during 
the periods when the US economy faced recession, such as in 1986, 2002, and 2008.  
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables for 1984–2017 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Max 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 0.066 0.091 0.000 0.013 0.038 0.081 0.778 
∆𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1 0.009 0.109 -0.280 -0.047 0.018 0.089 0.195 
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1
+  0.047 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.089 0.195 
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1
−  -0.039 0.071 -0.280 -0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 0.216 0.199 0.000 0.034 0.176 0.347 0.818 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 0.004 0.226 -2.015 0.004 0.057 0.109 0.393 
𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 1.898 1.813 0.383 1.015 1.287 2.025 30.872 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 0.045 0.214 -1.409 0.017 0.088 0.152 0.461 
𝑆𝑆ize𝑡𝑡 5.609 2.400 -0.098 3.848 5.531 7.256 12.820 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 0.029 0.016 -0.025 0.019 0.029 0.040 0.072 
Note: All variables are as defined in Table 1. The sample consists of 135,353 firm-year observations representing 
15,411 firms over 1984–2017. 
Figure 1: Oil price returns and corporate investment, 1984–2017 
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The median leverage is low and around 18% and the operating cash flows are around 
5.7% of total assets. Higher profitability and low leverage can enhance the firm position 
in taking corporate investments. The median value of Tobin’s Q, which reflects the ratio 
of market value to replacement costs of the firm’s assets, is around 1.3, indicating growing 
prospects potential for the average firm in the market. On average, the sample 
companies are profitable and the median company generates profits around 8.8% of 
total assets. Given the median firm size of 252 million dollars, the median amount of profits 
is around 22.176 million dollars. Finally, the real GDP of the US economy increased by 2.9%, 
on average, during the sample period. 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix coefficients of our main variables. Column 1 shows 
the correlation of corporate investment with each of our explanatory variables. There is 
a negative correlation between corporate investments and oil indicating a negative 
sensitivity of investments to oil price changes. Investments are more correlated with 
company profitability, cash flow, and economic growth than with variables such as size, 
leverage, or Tobin’s Q.  
Table 3: Pearson correlation coefficients 
 𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝑰𝒕𝒕 ∆𝑶𝑶𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏 ?̇?𝒐𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏+  ?̇?𝒐𝒕𝒕−𝟏𝟏−  𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝑳𝒕𝒕 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒕𝒕 𝑻𝑻𝒐𝒐𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 𝑸𝑸𝒕𝒕 𝑷𝑷𝑷𝑷𝒐𝒐𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕 𝑺𝑺𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝐢𝒕𝒕 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑷𝑷𝒕𝒕 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 1.000          
∆𝑂𝑂𝑡𝑡−1 -0.011 1.000         
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1
+  -0.024 0.816 1.000        
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1
−  0.002 0.886 0.455 1.000       
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 -0.092 -0.026 -0.017 -0.027 1.000      
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 0.132 0.010 -0.004 0.018 0.057 1.000     
𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 0.067 0.025 0.025 0.019 -0.217 -0.202 1.000    
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 0.139 0.006 -0.009 0.016 0.112 0.918 -0.200 1.000   
𝑆𝑆ize𝑡𝑡 -0.046 0.040 0.058 0.015 0.196 0.325 -0.213 0.339 1.000  
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 0.134 0.143 0.102 0.138 0.032 0.026 0.042 0.021 -0.171 1.000 
Note: All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
Table 4 presents estimates of six versions of Equation (2) we use to describe the response 
of US corporate investment to oil price changes in columns 1–6.7 Columns 1, 3, and 5 do 
not differentiate between positive and negative oil price returns shocks. Oil returns have 
a positive influence on the investments of oil and gas firms and a negative influence on 
the capital spending of the other companies. This is not unexpected, as the revenues of 
oil and gas companies benefit from higher oil prices, unlike the revenues of non-oil ones.  
The model estimates in columns 1, 3, and 5 are linear. In these models, the influence of 
oil price increases and decreases are described by the same parameter and, hence, 
they symmetric, which is not suitable for our purpose. Therefore, we decompose oil returns 
into positive and negative ones and re-estimate the model for the three samples. The 
 
7 The full sample includes oil and non-oil companies and is used to estimate models (1) and (2). The 
estimates are shown in columns 1 and 2. The parameters in columns 3 and 4 are generated from 
the sample excluding oil and gas companies. Finally, columns 5 and 6 show the estimates only for 
oil and gas companies. For each sample, we decompose the positive and negative oil price shocks 
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parameter estimates of oil price increases are now different from those of oil price 
decreases and are shown in columns 2, 4, and 6.  
Table 4: The asymmetric impact of oil prices on corporate investment  
  (SYS GMM regressions) 
 All firms Exclude crude oil and gas 
firms 
Crude oil and gas 
firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 0.0829*** 0.0833*** 0.0863*** 0.0867*** -0.0508*** -0.0513*** 








 (-3.170)  (-4.090)  (6.900)  
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1






  (-6.530)  (-7.090)  (2.320) 
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1
−   0.0030  0.0018  0.0780*** 




0.0967*** -0.0939*** -0.0934*** -0.3780*** -0.3769*** 
 (-24.740) (-24.620) (-25.000) (-24.860) (-20.540) (-20.360) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 0.0180*** 0.0179*** 0.0190*** 0.0190*** 0.0268 0.0273 
 (6.830) (6.800) (7.390) (7.360) (1.310) (1.340) 
𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡−1 0.0024*** 0.0024*** 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0171*** 0.0173*** 
 (7.000) (7.030) (7.580) (7.600) (5.150) (5.270) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 0.0149*** 0.0148*** 0.0089** 0.0088** 0.0928*** 0.0926*** 
 (3.870) (3.830) (2.340) (2.300) (4.420) (4.410) 
𝑆𝑆ize𝑡𝑡−1 -0.0022** -0.0021** -0.0043*** -0.0041*** 0.0265*** 0.0267*** 
 (-2.190) (-2.020) (-4.150) (-3.980) (8.640) (8.740) 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 0.1620*** 0.1673*** 0.1642*** 0.1693*** 0.5997*** 0.5916*** 




0.0007*** 0.0000*** -0.0004*** -0.0136** -0.0141** 
 (-2.690) (-3.460) (-2.100) (-2.890) (2.560) (-2.650) 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 0.0694*** 0.0691*** 0.0790 0.0786*** 0.0948*** 0.0943*** 
 (11.790) (11.740) (13.020) (12.960) (5.230) (5.200) 






























 26.73***  
(0.0000) 
 27.37***  
(0.0000) 
 0.40  
(0.5275) 
No. of firms 15,411 15,411 14,870 14,870 541 541 
Observations 135,353 135,353 131,129 131,129 4,224 4,224 
Note: This table reports the regression results of the impact of oil prices on corporate investment. The dependent 
variable is corporate investment 〖(INV〗_t), defined as the ratio of gross capital expenditures to book value of 
total assets in the previous year. Detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. All regressions are 
estimated using the two-step system-GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998). We adopt the procedure of Windmeijer (2005) to correct the standard errors of the two-step GMM 
estimates. The t − 2 to t – 4 lags of the variables are used as instruments in the difference equation and the same 
lags of differenced variables are used. The regressions include industry-year dummy variables and standard 
errors are clustered at industry level. Sargan is a test statistic for the validity of the instruments used, where 
rejection implies that the instruments are not valid. AR(2) is test statistics for second order autocorrelations. W_β 
represents the Wald test for the null hypothesis (β_oil^+=β_oil^-) against the alternative (β_oil^+≠β_oil^-). In all 
regressions, the industry effects based on four -digit SIC codes. Numbers in parentheses indicate the robust t 
statistics. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Column 4 shows that the investment of non-oil and gas companies is more significantly 
affected by oil price increases than by price decrease. The estimated parameters 
indicate that, for every 1% increase in oil prices, corporates reduce capital spending by 
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only 0.18% of total assets. These asymmetries highlight the importance of the impact of 
oil price increase on US corporate investment. They also highlight the high probability that 
corporations will not be able to recover lost investments for a subsequent fall in oil prices. 
The antepenultimate row shows the Wald test statistics of the null that corporate 
investment responds equally to increases and decreases in oil price. The null of an equal 
response is rejected and, therefore, we conclude that the influence of oil on US 
corporate investments is asymmetric. 
Column 6 reports the results for oil and gas companies. The parameters indicate that oil 
companies increase the proportion of capital spending by 8% and 6% following a 1% 
negative and positive change in the annual oil prices, respectively. It is clear that with an 
increase in oil prices, oil-producing company’s profitability will increase, thereby 
encouraging more capital investments. The same effect is observed with a decrease in 
oil prices. As oil prices drop, revenues of crude oil and natural gas companies decline as 
well—and in order to maintain their profit against low break-even prices, it is reasonable 
to expect that these companies will increase capital expenditures especially in new 
technology and innovation in order to enhance efficiency and operational flexibility 
which in turn reduce the operating cost. 
Table 5: Robustness checks: Alternative corporate investment measures  
(SYS GMM regressions) 
 All firms Exclude crude oil and gas firms Crude oil and gas firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 0.1822*** 0.1835*** 0.1239*** 
 (14.720) (14.550) (13.210) 
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1
+  -0.0543*** -0.0554*** 0.0621** 
 (-4.560) (-4.580)  (2.060) 
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1
−  0.0490* 0.0539* 0.0904* 
 (1.390) (1.720) (1.830) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 -0.1200*** -0.1228*** -0.1919*** 
 (-5.160) (-5.230) (-3.000) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 0.0343*** 0.0332*** 0.0260*** 
 (3.790) (3.760) (6.870) 
𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡−1 0.0783*** 0.0948** 0.0169*** 
 (3.360) (2.430) (3.040) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 0.0573*** 0.0575*** 0.0705*** 
 (3.940) (3.940) (2.740) 
𝑆𝑆ize𝑡𝑡−1 0.1717*** 0.1732*** 0.1900*** 
 (11.430) (11.250) (6.160) 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 0.0573*** 0.0547*** 0.1717*** 
 (3.170) (3.950) (3.170) 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 -0.0037*** -0.0027*** -0.0350*** 
  (-3.400) -(2.980) (2.520) 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 -0.0902*** -0.0811*** -0.0116*** 
  (-6.530) -(7.350) (-5.410) 
























No. of firms 15,411 14,870 541 
Observations 135,353 131,129 4,224 
Note: In this table, we undertake robustness checks. The dependent variable is corporate investment 〖(INV〗
_t), defined as the ratio change in net fixed assets plus depreciation to total assets in the previous year. The 
detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. All regressions are estimated using the two-step 
system-GMM estimator of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). We adopt the procedure 
of Windmeijer (2005) to correct the standard errors of the two-step GMM estimates. The t − 2 to t – 4 lags of the 
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The regressions include industry-year dummy variables and standard errors are clustered at the industry level. 
Sargan is a test statistic for the validity of the instruments used, where rejection implies that the instruments are 
not valid. AR(2) is test statistics for second order autocorrelations. W_β represents the Wald test for the null 
hypothesis (β_oil^+=β_oil^-) against the alternative (β_oil^+≠β_oil^-). In all regressions, the industry effects are 
based on four -digit SIC codes. The numbers in parentheses indicate the robust t statistics. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
The null of symmetry in the influence of oil price increases and decreases is not rejected 
by the Wald test statistics and, therefore, we may conclude oil companies respond 
similarly to positive and negative oil price changes. The lack of asymmetry can be 
explained by the long-term nature of oil company investments. The irreversibility of these 
investments implies a lower sensitivity to the oil price, meaning companies may respond 
similarly to positive and negative oil changes.  
Table 6:  Robustness checks: Alternative estimation method  
 (fixed effect regressions) 
 All Firms Exclude crude oil and gas 
firms 
Crude oil and gas firms 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡−1 0.0088*** 0.0033 0.2212*** 
 (2.610) (0.960) (7.180) 
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1
+  -0.0299*** -0.0311*** 0.0895** 
 (-4.090) (-4.140) (2.220) 
?̇?𝑜𝑡𝑡−1
−  0.0188* 0.0189* 0.0322 
 (1.840) (1.800) (0.600) 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1 0.0360*** 0.0362*** 0.1092*** 
 (8.150) (8.000) (2.840) 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡−1 0.0151*** 0.0145*** 0.1502*** 
 (3.030) (2.850) (2.880) 
𝑇𝑇𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡−1 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0236*** 
 (8.260) (8.040) (5.420) 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 0.0468*** 0.0463*** 0.0074*** 
 (7.540) (7.310) (3.140) 
𝑆𝑆ize𝑡𝑡−1 0.0061*** 0.0059*** 0.0098** 
 (9.150) (8.630) (2.160) 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1 0.4632*** 0.4615*** 0.3660** 
 (11.370) (11.060) (2.190) 
𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 -0.0075*** -0.0075*** -0.0010** 
 (-2.920) (-2.880) (0.050) 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 0.0715*** 0.0705*** 0.0477* 









No of firms 15,411 14,870 541 
Observations 135,353 131,129 4,224 
Note: In this table, we undertake a robustness checks using the fixed effects method. The dependent variable 
is corporate investment 〖(INV〗_t), defined as the ratio change in net fixed assets plus depreciation to total 
assets in the previous year. The detailed definitions of all variables are provided in Table 1. The regressions 
consider only time dummies and standard errors are clustered at the industry level. W_β represents the Wald 
test for the null hypothesis (β_oil^+=β_oil^-) against the alternative (β_oil^+≠β_oil^-). In all regressions, the 
industry effects are based on four -digit SIC codes. The numbers in parentheses indicate the robust t statistics. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.. 
The influence of the rest of the control variables on corporate investments in the US is as 
expected. For instance, companies tend to invest more when economic growth 
increases. US oil and non-oil corporates invest more following increases in cash flow and 
profitability. Moreover, Tobin’s Q is positively correlated with company investment and, 
hence, corporates may expand their asset bases if the market valuation of their assets 
has increased relative to the assets’ replacement costs. Size is found to negatively 
influence corporate investments.  
To further validate the findings, we undertake two robustness checks in Tables 5 and 6. 
Particularly, we use an alternative measure of investment in Table 5, which is defined as 
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year. Table 6 reports the results of Equation (2) using the fixed-effect method. We then re-
estimate Equation (2) and find the results are quantitatively similar to the primary 
investment measure and use the fixed-effect method. In column 1, the coefficient on the 
positive oil price return is negative and its value is greater (in absolute term) than the 
coefficient on the negative oil price return. We re-run the regression models as above 
using Equation (2) on the samples sorted by industry classification (i.e., US oil and non-oil 
corporates). Again, the results reported in columns 2 and 3 of Tables 5 and 6 are 
quantitatively similar to those previously obtained. 
 
4. Conclusion and Policy Implications  
The costs and revenues of current and potential company investments are influenced by 
oil prices. Hence, company expansion, growth, and investment may be affected by oil 
price changes and fluctuations. Corporations are generally expected to invest less when 
oil prices are high and uncertain, while oil and gas firms are expected to expand and 
invest more. In the literature, the relationship between oil and corporate investments has 
been extensively explored.8 In these studies, the response of investment to oil prices is 
linear and the different investment sensitivities to oil prices is not addressed. Therefore, we 
investigate whether corporate investment responds differently to oil price increases and 
decreases. This issue of asymmetric sensitivity to oil price is important, as it enables analysts 
to measure more accurately the responses of corporate investment to potential oil price 
changes. This is important for company growth prospects, whose value depends on 
assumptions regarding its capital spending. The issue is also important for modeling the 
investment decision of corporates and their dependence on the oil price. 
Consistent with the literature, we find corporate investments are influenced by the oil 
price. More importantly, capital expenditure and spending respond differently to oil price 
increases and decreases. Specifically, an increase hurts assets expansion more than a 
decrease benefits corporate investments. These asymmetries indicate that the lost 
investment following an increase in oil price may not be recovered even when oil prices 
decline. For oil and gas companies, the response of investment is linear and symmetric.  
These results highlight the importance of non-linear modeling for the influence of oil price 
changes on corporate investments. In particular, accounting for asymmetry when 
predicting the response of investment to oil price change becomes more accurate. 
Moreover, our results can potentially increase the shareholder value if firms manage the 





8 See, for instance, Edelstein and Kilian (2007), Hamilton (2009), Kilian (2009), Uri (1980), Mohn and 
Misund (2009), Elder and Serletis (2010), Yoon and Ratti (2011), Sadorsky (2011), Henriques and 
Sadorsky (2011), Sadath and Acharya (2015), Ratti et al. (2011), Wang et al. (2017), and Maghyereh 
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